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MAXIMIZING CUSTODY OPTIONS: ABOLISHING THE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY
MATTHEW A. Kipp*
1. INTRODUCTION
It is the end of a long day for a North Dakota district court judge. She
has retired to her chambers after spending the day presiding over a divorce
trial. The parties have stipulated to most of the issues, but have been unable
to resolve the issue of custody of their two children, ages seven and ten.
The lawyers for each side spent the day presenting testimony relating
to the child custody factors under section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota
Century Code.' The lawyers for each parent argued that it would be in the
* Law Clerk, East Central Judicial District, North Dakota. B.S., North Dakota State
University, 1994; J.D., University of North Dakota School of Law, 2001.
1. The statute states:
1. For the purpose of custody, the best interests and welfare of the child is
determined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting the
best interests and welfare of the child. These factors include all of the following
when applicable:
a. The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parents
and child.
b. The capacity and disposition of the parents to give the child love, affection,
and guidance and to continue the education of the child.
c. The disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing,
medical care, or other remedial care recognized and permitted under the
laws of this state in lieu of medical care, and other material needs.
d. The length of time the child has lived in a stable satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
e. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home.
f. The moral fitness of the parents.
g. The mental and physical health of the parents.
h. The home, school, and community record of the child.
i. The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express a
preference.
j. Evidence of domestic violence....
k. The interaction and interrelationship or the potential for interaction and
interrelationship, of the child with any person who resides in, is present, or
frequents the household of a parent and who may significantly affect the
child's best interests. The court shall consider that person's history of
inflicting, or tendency to inflict, physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or
the fear of physical harm, bodily injury, or assault, on other persons.
1. The making of false allegations not made in good faith, by one parent
against the other, of harm to a child as defined in section 50-25.1-02.
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best interests of the children to be in the custody of their respective client.
Listening to the testimony, it was clear to the judge that this was another
case where the children's best interests would be served by granting cus-
tody to either parent. The factors weighed equally in both parents' favor;
yet the judge has to make a decision that will make one parent the "winner."
This will force the losing parent to give up daily physical contact with the
children, and that parent will have to find a way to be satisfied with contact
consisting of maybe one day a week, a couple weekends a month, and a few
weeks during the summer.
Awarding custody of children has been acknowledged as the most dif-
ficult decision a judge must make,2 and this decision becomes even more
difficult in a situation where the law views both parents as equally fit.3 One
solution to this problem could be joint physical custody. 4 However, current
North Dakota law presents a roadblock for judges inclined to make such an
award.
North Dakota has a presumption against awarding joint physical cus-
tody.5 This presumption may be overcome if a district court finds that joint
physical custody is in the best interests of the child.6 But what does that
mean? The court has already made its findings on the best interests of the
child, and the calculus has come out equally for each parent. The case law
m. Any other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (1997 & Supp. 2001).
2. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621, 624 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., dissenting).
3. Id. Justice Levine discussed the criteria that a court must consider when determining
custody. Id.
4. For purposes of this article, joint physical custody means a child spends significant peri-
ods of time in the physical care of each parent. In re Marriage of Condon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 46
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998). Those jurisdictions that award joint physical custody acknowledge that
there is no requirement that the child spend an equal amount of time with each parent. Id. at n.13;
Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000); Tilley v. Tilley, 968 S.W.2d 208, 213
(Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
The counterpart to joint physical custody is joint legal custody, which means the parents
have joint authority to make important decisions affecting their child's welfare. Dickson v.
Dickson, 1997 ND 167, 1 , 568 N.W.2d 284, 286, overruled by Jarvis v. Jarvis, 1998 ND 163,
584 N.W.2d 84. In North Dakota, the term "joint legal custody" is a "meaningless amorphism"
unless the district court provides a definition. Id. This article will not address the issue of joint
legal custody because it is granted in a majority of cases without any dispute, and in a majority of
states, joint legal custody is encouraged or even required. 2 SANDRA MORGAN LITTLE, CHILD
CUSTODY AND VISITATION: LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.01[2], at 13-9 & app. 13.05 (1996). North
Dakota has legislatively adopted a presumption in favor of joint legal custody by granting each
parent certain rights and duties, which include many of the necessary components of joint legal
custody. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-28 (Supp. 2001) (listing the various rights and duties of
parents, which may only be restricted or excluded if the district court expresses a reason).
5. See Peek v. Berning, 2001 ND 34, 19, 622 N.W.2d 186, 193 (stating that it is generally




provides no guidance on what kind of findings would support a conclusion
that joint physical custody is in the be st interests of a child. If a court
simply states that it finds joint physical custody to be in the best interests of
the child, will that decision be upheld?
This article will analyze the history of the presumption against joint
physical custody in North Dakota and point out its origin and the reasons
given to support it. Then it will analyze the flaws in this reasoning, and
discuss some of the benefits of joint physical custody. The purpose of this
article is to encourage the North Dakota Supreme Court to eliminate the
presumption against joint physical custody so that it may be awarded more
easily in appropriate circumstances.
II. HISTORY OF THE PRESUMPTION
The first case addressing joint physical custody in North Dakota was
decided in 1975.7 In DeForest v. DeForest,8 the district court created a ro-
tating three-month custody schedule, under which each parent received
seven weeks of custody during the summer.9 On appeal, the North Dakota
Supreme Court stated that "[a] finding that a split or alternating custody is
in the best interests of a child, when supported by substantial evidence, is
not clearly erroneous, nor is it in actuality a finding that all things are
equal."10 The supreme court quoted Silseth v. Levangll for the proposition
that "it is not in the best interests of a child to unnecessarily change custody
and bandy the child back and forth between parents. Stability is
desirable."12
The significance of the court's use of Silseth is that Silseth was not a
joint physical custody case. 13 The father in Silseth had sole custody of his
daughter for approximately three years before the mother petitioned the
court for sole custody.14 The court stated that it was rarely appropriate to
7. DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 923-25 (N.D. 1975).
8. 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975).
9. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d at 922.
10. ld. at 925.
11. 214 N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1974).
12. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d at 925 (quoting Silseth, 214 N.W.2d at 364).
13. See generally Silseth, 214 N.W.2d 361 (evaluating a case in which the father had been
given custody in the divorce settlement).
14. See id. at 362-63 (stating that the father had custody of his daughter from approximately
May 1970 through the date of the court's decision on March 16, 1973). The mother had exercised
visitation with her daughter during this time. Id. at 362.
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change "custody when a child has been living happily in one place for a
substantial period."15
The language that the court relied on in Silseth and DeForest came
from a Nebraska case, which stated:
We do not believe it is in the best interests of a child to unneces-
sarily change custody and bandy the child back and forth between
parents. Stability is desirable. There has not been such a change
of circumstances here as would justify a finding that the best inter-
ests of the child again require a change in custody. "An original
decree fixing custody of minor children will not be modified un-
less there has been a change in circumstances indicating that the
person having custody is unfit for that purpose or that the best
interests of the child require such action."16
DeForest extended the rule previously used for sole custody situations
where the custodial relationship had been stable for several years, to a cus-
tody situation where each parent had physical custody of the child for a
period not lasting longer than four months.' 7 With DeForest, the North
Dakota Supreme Court announced its first basis for a presumption against
joint physical custody-children should not move back and forth between
their parents. 18
Five years later, in 1980, the North Dakota Supreme Court had its
second opportunity to deal with the issue of joint physical custody.19 Lapp
v. Lapp2O contains the most extensive discussion to date on the subject of
joint physical custody in North Dakota.2' The court acknowledged that
there was "no general agreement among courts, lawyers, psychologists,
behavioral scientists, social workers, or other professionals in the family
15. Id. at 364. In support of this common sense assertion, the court quoted the following
passage from American Jurisprudence: "Where young children have been placed in one home
and have remained there for a substantial period of time and the situation seems satisfactory, there
is a reluctance to uproot the children from familiar surroundings and place them in a strange home
with a parent who hardly knows them." Id. (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce and Separation §
820 (1973)).
16. Scripter v. Scripter, 208 N.W.2d 85, 86 (Neb. 1973) (quoting Packett v. Packett, 172
N.W.2d 86, 87 (Neb. 1970)).
17. Compare Silseth, 214 N.W.2d at 362-63 (stating that the father had sole custody of his
daughter from approximately May 1970 to March 1973), with DeForest, 228 N.W.2d at 922
(quoting the district court's custody order, which granted the defendant custody from January 12,
1975, to Memorial Day 1975, and each party seven weeks of custody during the summer of 1975).
18. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d at 925 (quoting Silseth, 214 N.W.2d at 364).
19. See Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 124 (N.D. 1980) (quoting the trial court's order
granting physical custody of the child to each parent in alternating six month periods).
20. 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980).
21. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 130-31.
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law field as to the wisdom and desirability of joint custody arrangements." 22
As an example of the disadvantage of a joint physical custody arrangement,
the court quoted the following passage from the American Law Reports:
A frequent shifting of a child from home to home exposes it to
changes of discipline and habits, and may invite lax discipline and
obedience. Stability in the human factors affecting a child's emo-
tional life and development is essential, and it may be argued that
this stability can best be attained with such an undivided custody
as will prevent the child from being shunted back and forth
between homes.23
The court also noted the important advantages and benefits to this
"Solomonic" 24 arrangement. 25 For example, joint physical custody pro-
vides the child with the needed interaction and interrelationship with both
parents, siblings, and "other persons who may significantly affect the
child's best interests." 26
Despite recognizing the lack of a consensus regarding joint physical
custody, the court again decided to side with the view that joint physical
custody is generally not in the best interests of children. 27 Notably, in
Lapp, the supreme court upheld, with some reservation, 28 the district court's
award of joint physical custody. 29 After the parties separated, the mother
maintained sole custody of the child under a temporary custody order that
22. Id. at 130.
23. Id. (quoting M. L. Cross, Annotation, Split, Divided, or Alternate Custody of Children,
92 A.L.R. 2D 695, 698-99 (1963)). In 1963, the literature related to joint custody was "egregious-
ly inadequate." See W. Glenn Clingempeel & N. Dickon Reppucci, Joint Custody After Divorce:
Major Issues and Goals for Research, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 87, 88 (Jay
Folberg ed. 1984) (stating that in 1969 the research on child custody adjudication and joint cus-
tody was sparse). Even in 1982, "[mlethodologically defensible studies focusing directly on ad-
vantages and disadvantages of joint versus single-parent custody [were] virtually nonexistent." Id.
24. While the court referred to joint physical custody as being a decision born of Solomon's
wisdom, Justice Levine later commented that joint physical custody is the "antithesis" of "Sol-
omonic." Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 501-02 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting).
She noted that King Solomon
did not offer the contestants who appeared before him divided custody of the sought-
after child and I assume he refrained from doing so for obvious reasons. It may have
provided an easy out but it would have resolved neither the underlying contest of
parenthood nor the source of continuing upheaval in the continuity of the child's life.
Id. at 502.
25. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 130.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 128 (stating "[wie have recognized that it is not in the best interests of a child
to unnecessarily change custody and bandy the child back and forth between the parents").
28. See id. at 129 (stating that if it had sat in the place of the trial court, "the outcome may
have been different").
29. Id. The district court awarded the parents alternating six-month periods of custody. Id.
at 124.
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also granted the father visitation "at least one day each week." 30 Because
the mother had only given the father short visits on Saturdays, the trial court
awarded joint physical custody.31 The trial court also stated that joint
physical custody was "the least detrimental alternative" in the case.32
With Lapp, the court provided an explanation for its concern about a
child moving back and forth between parents.33 The complete proposition
can be summarized as follows: It is generally not in the best interests of a
child to move between parents34 because there are changes in discipline and
habits between the two parents, which "may invite lax discipline and dis-
obedience," and a sole custody arrangement arguably provides the type of
stability necessary for a child's emotional life and development. 35
The next joint physical custody case was in 1989.36 While the majority
opinion did not change the state of the law, Justice Levine discussed an
important concern in her dissent.37 She mentioned a study conducted by
Dr. Judith Wallerstein and Susan Steinman that analyzed joint physical cus-
tody where the parents were involved in an ongoing dispute with each
other. 38 Based upon their study, Wallerstein and Steinman were opposed to
"encouraging or mandating joint custody or frequent access when parents
are in ongoing disputes." 39
30. Id. at 129.
31. Id. The supreme court noted several other options that it could have imposed instead of
joint physical custody. Id. It suggested that the court could have awarded sole custody to one
parent and given the noncustodial parent liberal and extensive visitation rights. Id. Another
option could have been an award where one parent had custody during the school months with the
other party having custody for a substantial part of the summer vacation. Id. As a third pos-
sibility, the court suggested alternating custody from school year to school year with the opposite
parent having custody for the summer vacations. Id.
However, the court did not reverse the trial court and impose any of its suggestions because
it was limited by the "clearly erroneous" standard of review. Id. The supreme court may only set
aside a trial court's findings of fact if it is "left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made." Id. at 125 (quoting Nastrom v. Nastrom, 284 N.W.2d 576, 580 (N.D. 1979))
(addressing the clearly erroneous standard of review). Because the court was not left with a
definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake, it upheld the joint physical
custody award. Id. at 129.
32. Id. at 129-30. The supreme court noted that it would have preferred a statement from
the trial court that joint physical custody was "in the best interests of the child" but "least
detrimental alternative" was close enough. Id.
33. Id. at 129-31.
34. DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 925 (N.D. 1975) (quoting Silseth v. Levang,
214 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D. 1974)).
35. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980) (quoting Cross, supra note 23, at 698-
99).
36. Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 497 (N.D. 1989). The trial court awarded six
months alternating custody to each parent. Id.
37. Id. at 500 (Levine, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. (citing C. Rick Chamberlin, Joint Custody, TRIAL, Apr. 1989).
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This concern about awarding joint physical custody when the parents
cannot get along was discussed in the 1998 case Jarvis v. Jarvis.40 The
court adopted the following position: "Legal writers and child development
professionals are in general agreement that a joint custody arrangement can
work only if the parents are able to cooperate." 41 The trial court found that
a joint physical custody arrangement would require the parents to
communicate "a lot."42 Because the parents communicated "very little," the
trial court did not award joint physical custody.43
While the supreme court did not make a connection between the
parents' severe anger toward each other and its effect on the best interests
of a child, implicit in its decision was the theory that a custody arrangement
that will increase the tension in an already volatile relationship between the
parents is not in the best interests of a child.4 In Jarvis, the trial court
specifically found that the plaintiff had feelings of anger and hostility
toward the defendant. 45 The plaintiff was "very angry" that his ex-wife
remained in their marital home.46 The trial court stated that a joint legal and
physical custody arrangement would only continue the animosity between
the two parties.47 To avoid this continued animosity, the court awarded sole
custody to the mother with the father receiving "regular quality time." 48
Because a court's custody decision is based on the best interests of the
child,49 it must have been concerned that a custody arrangement that would
contribute to the animosity between the parents would not be in the best
interests of the children. 50
Also in 1998, the supreme court added one final rule to its joint physi-
cal custody jurisprudence. In In re Lukens,51 the court again relied on the
treatise it used in Jarvis for the following statement: "Infants and preschool
children have special needs, generally commanding special attention from
40. 1998 ND 163, 584 N.W.2d 84. The court did not mention Justice Levine's dissent from
Kaloupek where she addressed the same issue. Jarvis, 5 36, 584 N.W.2d at 92.
41. Id. (quoting 2 JOHN P. MCCAHEY ET AL., CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW AND







48. Id. The court did not expound on what constituted "regular quality time."
49. See Silseth v. Levang, 214 N.W.2d 361, 363 (N.D. 1974) (stating that the district courts
must award custody based on what is in the best interests of the child).
50. See Jarvis v. Jarvis, 1998 ND 163, 5 37, 584 N.W.2d 84, 92 (noting the repeated refer-
ences in the district court's opinion to anger, hostility, and animosity between the parents).
51. 1998 ND 224, 587 N.W.2d 141.
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the courts. Awards rotating the residence of a very young child are pre-
sumptively not in the child's best interests and absent some justification
will be reversed." 52
This review of the case law on joint physical custody reveals three gen-
eral rules. First, it is generally not in the child's best interests for a court to
award joint physical custody53 because of the possibility of lax discipline
and stunted development. 54 Second, there is an even stronger presumption
that joint physical custody is not in the best interests of a child if the parents
have a volatile relationship.55 Third, there is a similar strong presumption
against joint physical custody in the case of very young children.56 These
presumptions may be overcome if a court finds that joint physical custody
is in the best interest of a child.57
III. THE FLAWS IN THE ARGUMENT AGAINST JOINT PHYSICAL
CUSTODY
While North Dakota has only expressed two justifications58 for its
general presumption against joint physical custody, other commentators
have identified additional concerns with joint physical custody. Some
52. Lukens, T 15, 587 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting LITTLE, supra note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45).
The court did not explain what "special needs" of very young children make the presumption
against joint physical custody even stronger. Id. The treatise also did not explain what it meant
by special needs. LITTLE, supra note 4, at § 13.06[4], at 13-45. The following quote may provide
some insight into special needs:
Joint custody of very young children requires an extraordinary degree of cooperation
and communication between estranged parents. They must be able to discuss daily
details of naptime, runny noses, toilet training, teething, diaper rash, and so on. Each
parent must set up routines and schedules to coincide with day care arrangements.
JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN, WOMEN, AND
CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 263 (1989).
53. Peek v. Berning, 2001 ND 34, T 19, 622 N.W.2d 186, 193; Kasprowicz v. Kasprowicz,
1998 ND 68, T 15, 575 N.W.2d 921, 924; see also Wetzel v. Wetzel, 1999 ND 29, 1 11, 589
N.W.2d 889, 894 (stating "we have clearly noted our disfavor with shared custody arrangements
in which a child is bandied back and forth between parents"); Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d
496, 497 (N.D. 1989) (stating "we have recognized that it is not in the best interests of a child to
unnecessarily change custody or to bandy the child back and forth between parents...").
54. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980) (quoting Cross, supra note 23, at 698-
99).
55. Jarvis, TT 36-37, 584 N.W.2d at 92.
56. Lukens, T 15, 587 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting LITTLE, supra note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45).
57. Wetzel, T 11, 589 N.W.2d at 894 (stating "the trial court must make specific findings
demonstrating shared custody is in the best interests of the child"); Kasprowicz, T 15, 575 N.W.2d
at 924; see also Peek, T 20, 622 N.W.2d at 193 (stating "[r]otating physical custody is not clearly
erroneous when supported by a district court's findings that alternating custody is in the best inter-
ests of a child"); Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 497-98; Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 128.
58. The argument is that children should not be bandied back and forth between parents be-
cause of a concern for lax discipline and a concern that they will not develop properly unless they
have the kind of stability provided by a sole custody situation. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 130 (quoting
Cross, supra note 23, at 698-99).
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argue that joint physical custody increases the parents' attachment to each
other, 59 prolongs the conflict between parents, 60 and can be used as a
coercive tool in divorce negotiations. 6 1 Anecdotal evidence also
demonstrates the problems parents can have with joint physical custody
when each household has drastically different lifestyles and rules.62
A. THE FLAWS IN NORTH DAKOTA'S PRESUMPTION
The main problem with North Dakota's presumption is that it was
created by extending a concept with roots in the law of change of custody,
which is a different area of law than an original custody decision. 63 In
order to change custody, the court must find that there is a "compelling" or
"significant reason" for doing so.64 "In a modification proceeding, the best
interests of the child must be gauged against the backdrop of the stability of
the child's relationship with the custodial parent." 65 In an original custody
decision there is no custodial parent, so the best interest factors do not have
that "backdrop." 66 Unlike a modification proceeding, an original custody
decision is solely concerned with the best interests of the child and does not
require a "compelling" or "significant" reason. 67
By applying the law of change of custody to joint physical custody
awards, the supreme court has imputed the false idea that somehow the
child's current "stable" situation will be changed by an award of joint
physical custody. In the case of a divorcing couple, 68 no matter what kind
of original custody award is made, it will be different from the child's
current living situation, which allows the child to spend significant time
with both parents. The fact that the parents are getting divorced has
59. See, e.g., Stephanie N. Barnes, Comment, Strengthening the Father-Child Relationship
Through a Joint Custody Presumption, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 601, 615 (1999) (citing
Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 95).
60. See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Symposium, The Parent-Child Relation-
ship and the Current Cycle of Family Law Reform: Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
455, 494 (1984).
61. See, e.g., Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REV. 497, 515-16 (1988).
62. See WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 263-64 (discussing the problems of
different bedtimes, rules about sleeping with parents, and rules about watching television).
63. Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 610 (N.D. 1992).
64. Id. at 609. In 1997, the legislature codified the supreme court's approach to change of
custody proceedings. Anderson v. Resler, 2000 ND 183, 8, 618 N.W.2d 480, 484. This codifi-
cation is found at section 14-09-06.6(6) of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.
65. Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. For purposes of this discussion, an unmarried couple who has been living together with
a child would also be in the same position as a divorcing couple.
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eliminated the possibility of maintaining stability because no custody award
can create a situation where the child will continue to live in the same
household with both parents. 69
Coupled with this false idea of stability is the idea that a child should
not be unnecessarily bandied back and forth between parents. 70 By bor-
rowing this idea from the change of custody law, this concept is flawed
when applied to an original award of joint physical custody. Unlike a
change of custody case, the child has not been living for a long period of
time with one parent. 71 When the court discusses bandying the child back
and forth between parents, it is referring to changing sole custody after the
child has been with one parent for a substantial period of time. 72 In an
original custody decision, it is not likely that the child has been in either
parent's sole custody for a substantial period of time.
Even applying this concept of moving the child back and forth
frequently between parents outside the change of custody area, the court's
expressed aversion to this practice in a joint physical custody situation ig-
nores the reality of a typical sole custody with visitation arrangement. 73 In
a sole custody with visitation arrangement, the child will be moving back
and forth between parents several times a month in order to satisfy a typical
two weekends a month visitation schedule. In the case of a "liberal visi-
tation" or "reasonable visitation" award, this moving back and forth
between households becomes even more frequent.
If there is a concern with frequently moving the child back and forth
between homes, then joint physical custody actually reduces the frequency
of these transitions. On a two-week or monthly alternating schedule, the
69. It has been argued that only a joint physical custody award can most closely approxi-
mate the child's prior living arrangement because it continues giving the child significant periods
of time with each parent. Jo-Ellen Paradise, The Disparity Between Men and Women in Custody
Disputes: Is Joint Custody the Answer to Everyone's Problems?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 517, 576
(1998). In that way, if the courts are truly concerned with stability in a child's life, a joint physi-
cal custody award would be the preferred custody award. "Birdnesting," which allows children to
stay in the home, WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 256-57, is arguably the most
stable joint physical custody award because the children do not have to move between two
different residences.
70. DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 925 (N.D. 1975) (quoting Silseth v. Levang,
214 N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D. 1974)).
71. Cf. Silseth, 214 N.W.2d at 363 (stating that the child had been living with her father for
approximately three years).
72. Id.; see also Blotske v. Leidholm, 487 N.W.2d 607, 609 (N.D. 1992) (stating that the
district court ordered a change in sole custody approximately three years after the original custody
award).
73. See Muller Davis & Jody Meyer Yazici, Best Interest of the Child: The Case for Joint
Custody Even in Contested Divorce, 84 ILL. B.J. 348, 351 (1996) (stating that shifting children




number of exchanges between households is less than with a typical week-
end visitation schedule or a liberal visitation schedule. With a two-week or
monthly alternating schedule, the number of face-to-face meetings between
the parents is also reduced, which would reduce the potential for conflict.
Another reason North Dakota has been opposed to joint physical cus-
tody is based on a concern that it will stunt a child's development.74 The
first problem with this theory is that it is contrary to North Dakota's pre-
sumption that it is in the best interests of a child to spend time with both
parents. 75 An arrangement allowing a child to maximize his or her time
with both parents would seem to better suit the presumption in favor of the
child spending time with both parents.
The second problem with this development theory is that there are
studies that have shown no discernable negative or positive impact on a
child's development when comparing sole custody to joint custody. 76 One
study, entitled the Stanford Custody Project, followed approximately 1100
families in California, and the researchers interviewed children between the
ages of ten and eighteen for their perceptions about their family
environments.77 The study found that there were very few differences in
the children's development when comparing sole custody arrangements
with joint physical custody arrangements. 78
The final problem North Dakota has identified is that joint physical
custody may create lax discipline. 79 However, this problem is not unique to
a joint physical custody arrangement. If the noncustodial parent has a dif-
ferent approach to discipline, the child will be exposed to that approach
74. See Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980) (quoting Cross, supra note 23, at
699, which stated, "Stability in the human factors affecting a child's emotional life and
development is essential...").
75. See Blotske, 487 N.W.2d at 610 (citing Dschaak v. Dschaak, 479 N.W.2d 484, 487
(N.D. 1992)) (stating that visitation between a child and her noncustodial parent is presumed to be
in the best interests of the child). North Dakota's presumption is supported by a substantial body
of research that has found continued contact with both parents is beneficial to children. Scott &
Derdeyn, supra note 60, at 488; see also WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 257
(stating that her research "consistently shows that good father-child relationships can be critically
important to the psychological well-being and self-esteem of children of divorce").
76. See CHRISTY M. BUCHANAN ET AL., ADOLESCENTS AFTER DIVORCE 71 (1996) (stating
that children in dual-residence arrangements had relationships with their parents that were similar
to relationships children in sole-residence arrangements had with their parents); WALLERSTEIN &
BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 266-67 (stating that children in joint physical custody arrangements
were similar developmentally to children in sole custody arrangements).
77. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 8-9.
78. See id. at app. B, ThIs. B.6 & B.9 (noting very few significant differences between sole
custody residences and dual custody residences on a variety of factors, including depression,
school grades, antisocial behavior, and relationship with parents). The authors also commented on
their surprise at finding that the children living in joint physical custody arrangements had
"somewhat better functioning" than children living in sole custody arrangements. Id. at 78.
79. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 130 (quoting Cross, supra note 23, at 698-99).
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whenever the noncustodial parent is exercising his or her visitation,
possibly several times per month. The only difference with joint physical
custody is that the child is exposed to that different living and discipline
style for a continuous period.
The nature of visitation actually contributes to this discipline problem
more than a joint physical custody arrangement. The noncustodial parent
often takes on the role of a "favorite babysitter" and tries to fill visitation
periods with as many "fun" activities as possible to maximize the quality of
the limited time the noncustodial parent has with the child.80 This situation
promotes the possibility of lax discipline because the noncustodial parent
may be less likely to reprimand the child or enforce rules because that
would ruin the fun environment. With a joint physical custody
arrangement, both parents have significant blocks of time to spend with the
child. Therefore, both parents can more closely approximate a daily living
schedule without worrying about making every minute fun for the child.
Beyond the general presumption against joint physical custody, there is
one other specific presumption to address. North Dakota has adopted a pre-
sumption against joint physical custody in the case of very young
children. 81 The rationale behind this presumption is not clear,82 and the
literature on joint physical custody rarely addresses any special concern
with very young children, 83 which makes this a difficult issue to address.
In support of this presumption, the North Dakota Supreme Court has
explained that very young children have special needs. 84 These special
needs probably include naptime, toilet training, and day care.8 5 However,
with a two-week or monthly rotating custody schedule, a child would spend
80. Barnes, supra note 59, at 619; see also Davis & Yazici, supra note 73, at 350 (stating
that the New Jersey Supreme Court refers to noncustodial fathers as "zoo daddies"); Paradise,
supra note 69, at 551 (noting that fathers with visitation have been described as "Disneyland
Daddys [sic]").
81. In re Lukens, 1998 ND 224, 5 15, 587 N.W.2d 141, 145 (quoting LITrLE, supra note 4,
§ 13.06[4], at 13-45).
82. See id. (quoting LITTLE, supra note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45) (stating that infants and pre-
school children have special needs). The North Dakota Supreme Court has never explained how
these "special needs" militate against an award of joint physical custody.
83. Only the CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION: LAW AND PRACTICE treatise by Sandra
Morgan Little appears to address this issue. LITTLE, supra note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45. The
treatise only cites to one case in its discussion about joint physical custody of very young children.
Id. (citing generally In re S.M.H., 531 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Ct. App. 1988)). In re S.M.H. did not
make any special rule about very young children. In re S.M.H., 531 So. 2d at 231. The court only
stated a general presumption against rotating the physical residence of a child. Id. That case
involved custody of a child under the age of one. See id. at 229 (stating "[t]his is a dispute
between an unwed 15-year-old mother (appellant) and the 16-year-old father (appellee/cross-
appellant) over custody of their five-month-old baby daughter").
84. Lukens, 15, 587 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting LITTLE, supra note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45).
85. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 263.
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substantial, consistent time with one parent, which would allow that parent
to maintain a continuous schedule. This continuity would alleviate the
problems associated with a more frequent rotation schedule.
While North Dakota has identified some legitimate problems with joint
physical custody, these problems are not significantly different from a
custody arrangement where both parents are still involved in the child's life.
As will be discussed later, there are several positive aspects to a joint
physical custody arrangement that should be balanced against any negative
aspects.
B. A RESPONSE TO THE OTHER ARGUMENTS
Some commentators point to the negative impact joint physical custody
may have on the parents by increasing their attachment to each other.86 The
answer to this argument is that child custody decisions are not concerned
with how the arrangement will affect the parents because the court is only
concerned with the best interests of the child.87 "Divorced parents must
recognize that the disturbing situation was brought about by them." 88 If a
joint physical custody arrangement increases the parents' attachment to
each other, then they must learn to live with the situation they created. 89
Another concern regarding parents is that a joint physical custody
arrangement may prolong conflict between them.90 While this concern
relates to the negative impact on the parents, it also has an effect on the
children. Several studies have found a detrimental impact on children who
are exposed to significant levels of interparental conflict.9' However,
concern for continuing conflict between parents is still primarily an
argument focused on the parents. It is unfortunate that commentators
recommend punishing children92 based on their parents' behavior. Because
it is the parents who have created the traumatic situation, they should be the
ones who have to learn to cooperate for the best interests of their child. If
the focus were truly on the best interests of children, then a better solution
86. Barnes, supra note 59, at 615; see also Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 95
(speculating that if joint custody increases the amount of continued contact between parents, it
may make the "emotional divorce" more difficult).
87. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (1997) (stating that a court must consider the best
interests of a child when making a custody decision).
88. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980).
89. See id. at 130-31 (stating that the parents caused the divorce, and they must do
everything possible to reduce the negative consequences).
90. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at 494.
91. Id. at 490-91.
92. Because it is in the child's best interests to have substantial contact with both parents,
removing that contact punishes the child. See id. at 488 (stating that a large body of evidence
demonstrates that frequent contact with both parents after divorce is beneficial to children).
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would be a court-ordered parental cooperation course as the first step,
instead of forcing children to lose out on substantial contact with both
parents.
Even when the court awards sole physical custody, there is no
guarantee that parental conflict will end or be reduced. One group of
researchers investigated the "nature and magnitude of postdivorce
turbulence involving children." 93 The researchers discovered that thirty-one
percent of the studied cases found "evidence of repeated and intensive
interaction between the divorced couples." 94 One reason for this increased
conflict may result from the fact that there is no longer any reason for the
parents to compromise once the marriage has ended.95
Some commentators also argue against joint custody because some par-
ents use the threat of a custody battle to coerce financial concessions from
the other parent during divorce negotiations. 96 The main flaw with this
argument is that it is not uniquely addressed to the debate over joint physi-
cal custody. Even in jurisdictions where there is no presumption in favor of
joint physical custody, one parent can threaten to seek sole physical custody
to extract financial concessions. Because this article does not advocate a
presumption in favor of joint physical custody, this argument holds even
less weight. The real solution to the problem of parents who use custody as
a coercive tool is formulating methods to eliminate that potential. 97
A final problem attributed with joint physical custody is the practical
difficulties parents will experience because of differences in the lifestyles
between the two households. 98 For example, if parents have different
bedtimes for children, they often report that the children will "come home
tired and red-eyed from one home and cannot fall asleep in the other."99
Another example relates to rules about television. Parents reported being
upset if the other parent allowed the child to watch certain shows or allowed
the child to watch a lot of television.100
93. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 94.
94. Id.
95. Andrew Schepard, Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After
Divorce, 64 TEX. L. REV. 687, 717 (1985).
96. Singer & Reynolds, supra note 61, at 515-16.
97. See Katharine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the Dependen-
cy Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 39-40 (1985) (stating "[tlhe solution to these prob-
lems, if joint custody is found to be otherwise desirable, is not to reject joint custody but to
examine possibilities for improving its implementation that do not perpetuate or worsen the effects
of traditional gender role arrangements").
98. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 263-65.
99. Id. at 263.
100. Id. at 263-64.
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These complaints are concerned with difficulties the parents experience
as opposed to any recognized detriment to the child.101 These differences in
households will also be problems for parents where liberal visitation,
reasonable visitation, or just two-weekends-a-month visitation is awarded.
Whenever a child returns from a noncustodial parent's household, if there
were any significant differences in lifestyle, the custodial parent will
experience frustration getting the child readjusted to the custodial parent's
household. Because there is no recognized detriment to the child, and these
same problems exist whenever there is a visitation award, these practical
difficulties do not provide a persuasive argument against awarding joint
physical custody.
IV. THE ARGUMENT TO ELIMINATE NORTH DAKOTA'S
PRESUMPTION AGAINST JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY
In the only North Dakota case to analyze the pros and cons of joint
physical custody, the North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged that there
was no general agreement among professionals in the family law area
regarding the desirability of joint physical custody. 02 Despite making this
comment, the court sided with the theory that joint physical custody is not
beneficial for a child.103 Since the presumption against joint physical cus-
tody was introduced in 1975,104 the supreme court has not revisited the
topic. The following section enumerates and discusses some of the benefits
of joint physical custody as those benefits relate to the best interests of the
child.
101. Id. at 262-66. The researchers did not discover any harm to the children resulting from
the different lifestyles at the two households. See id. at 266-67 (stating that the joint custody chil-
dren resembled children raised in traditional sole custody households). Two other researchers
hypothesized that very dissimilar homes may cause stress to the child, but they also pointed to two
studies suggesting that "school-age, preadolescent children adjust well to alternating between very
dissimilar.., homes as long as there is a predictable schedule of alternations and cooperation
between the parents." Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 98.
102. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980). The reasoning in Lapp relied
heavily on a 1963 article from the American Law Reports. Id. (quoting Cross, supra note 23, at
698-99). Since 1963, the claim that "bandying the child back and forth between homes" is
somehow harmful to children has been debunked. See Susan Steinman, The Experience of
Children in Joint Custody Arrangement: A Report and Study, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 403,
414 (1981) (stating that the result of her study found "most of the children were able to master the
practical problems of joint custody, and this, combined with a sense that both parents loved and
wanted them, enhanced their self-esteem").
103. See Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 128 (stating that it was not in the child's best interests to
bandy the child back and forth between the parents).
104. DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 925 (N.D. 1975); Silseth v. Levang, 214
N.W.2d 361, 364 (N.D. 1974).
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A. BENEFITS OF JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY
One of the most significant benefits of a joint physical custody arrange-
ment is that it more closely approximates the family situation the child had
before the parents divorced or stopped living together. 05 Studies have
shown that substantial contact with both parents after a divorce has a
positive effect on children. 06 Correlated with this principle, studies have
also consistently shown a negative impact on children if there is an absence
of contact with noncustodial parents after a divorce. 107
One researcher found three major areas where children benefit from
joint physical custody:
First, they received the clear message that they were loved and
wanted by both parents. Second, they had a sense of importance in
their family and the knowledge that their parents made great ef-
forts to jointly care for them, both factors being important to their
self-esteem. Third, they had physical access to both parents, and
the psychological permission to love and be with both parents.
This protected them from the crippling loyalty conflicts often seen
in children who are caught in the crossfire of their parents'
ongoing battles. 108
Other benefits for children from continued substantial contact with both
parents include demonstrating less aggression and stress and functioning
"more effectively in work and in social relations with peers."1 09 Another
benefit of joint physical custody is that it "potentially offers a larger array
105. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 76, at 71 (stating that adolescents in a dual-
residence arrangement maintained relationships with each parent at a level consistent with what
one would find if the child was in a sole-residence arrangement with each parent).
106. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at 489 (stating that several researchers have found
that frequent contact with both parents is associated with positive adjustment in children); see also
Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 91 (noting that "[i]n the majority of cases, frequent
interaction with the noncustodial parent has been found to have a positive effect on children's
adjustment to divorce"). Researchers have reported benefits such as children experiencing fewer
negative effects of divorce, less aggression and stress, better functioning in work and social
relations with peers, and less trauma as a result of the divorce. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at
489.
107. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at 489 (stating that studies have shown that the
absence of the father, the noncustodial parent, is correlated with increased delinquency and anti-
social behavior in children); see also WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 257 (stating
that their studies revealed that adolescents' psychological well-being and self-esteem were parti-
cularly vulnerable when the children were deprived of relationships with their fathers, the
noncustodial parents).
108. Susan Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn, and the
Judicial and Legislative Implications, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 111, 115 (Jay
Folberg ed. 1984).
109. Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at 489.
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of positive characteristics" for the child to model, and the child has a
"greater variety of cognitive and social stimulation.""10
A joint physical custody arrangement creates substantial contact with
both parents, which lessens the losses that accompany a divorce."'1 By
more closely approximating the situation a child was in before the divorce,
the child's best interests are served because meaningful relationships with
both parents are maintained."12  A joint physical custody arrangement
allows children to reap the benefits of continued significant contact with
both parents,"13 and the children are in a better position to avoid the
negative impact created by the absence of one parent. 114
Another benefit of joint physical custody is a higher incidence of pay-
ing child support." 5 In a study published in 1998, researchers found a
correlation between higher child support payments and joint physical custo-
dy arrangements."l 6 The researchers believed this correlation was support-
ed by the monitoring theory,"17 which states that when a parent making
financial contributions to the other parent is able to see how the money is
spent, the payor will be more inclined to make the child support
payments. 18
110. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 92-93; see also Schepard, supra note 95, at
705 (stating that regular contact with both parents increases the quality of parenting the child
receives).
111. WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 257.
112. See Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at 489 (discussing studies that found a positive
impact on children who had frequent contact with both parents after divorce).
113. See id. (stating that several researchers have found that frequent contact with both
parents is associated with positive adjustment in children).
114. See id. (stating that studies have shown that the absence of the father, the noncustodial
parent, is correlated with increased delinquency and antisocial behavior in children); see also
WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 257 (stating that their studies revealed
adolescents' psychological well-being and self-esteem were particularly vulnerable when the
children were deprived of relationships with their fathers, the noncustodial parents).
115. See Margaret F. Brinig & F. H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring
Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 423 (1998) (stating "[o]ur joint-custody dummy variable was also sig-
nificantly and positively correlated with child-support ratios, as predicted by monitoring
theories"); see also Schepard, supra note 95, at 706-07 (discussing a study that found fathers who
regularly visited their children paid their child support more consistently than fathers who visited
less or not at all). At the time of this writing, North Dakota's child support guidelines did not
provide a method for calculating child support in joint physical custody arrangements. Knutson v.
Knutson, 2002 ND 29, J 20, 639 N.W.2d 495, 502. To determine child support, a court must
determine "the needs of the child and the ability of the parent to pay." Id. However, a current
amendment to the child support guidelines will address the issue of joint physical custody.
Proposed N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.1-08.2 (2002).
116. Brinig & Buckley, supra note 115, at 423.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 393. When the payors do not have frequent access to their children, they assume
that some of their financial contributions are being misspent. Id.
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Increased frequency in child support payments is in a child's best
interests for a number of reasons. It raises a child's standard of living.'1 9 It
can also reduce or eliminate anxiety over financial matters, which negative-
ly impact everyone, including the child. Reliable child support payments
also provide stability for the child.
Two other advantages to joint physical custody relate to the individual
problems associated with the dynamic between a sole custody parent and a
noncustodial parent. A sole custody parent has increased child-rearing
demands, which can impair the parent's social and recreational life.120 This
situation can detrimentally impact a child by impairing the quality of the
custodial parent's relationship with the child.121 Also, the noncustodial
parent can often feel significant emotional distress as a result of becoming
marginalized as a parent and losing contact with the child.122 Because an
emotionally distraught parent is unable to completely engage with a child,
this situation is detrimental to children.123 Joint physical custody can
alleviate both these problems by giving each parent a more balanced life,
which is in a child's best interests because it improves the quality of each
parents' relationship with the child.
Based on the important benefits of joint physical custody that are in the
best interests of a child, this article argues that it is not in the best interests
of a child to perpetuate the legal presumption against joint physical
custody. 124 The following section summarizes the various aspects of this
article's proposal.
B. SUMMARY
The current custody scheme in North Dakota requires a court to
consider the best interests of a child when deciding which parent shall be
awarded custody.125 It is only when a court finds that both parents are
equally fit under the best interest factors that joint physical custody is an
option. Because domestic violence is taken into account in the best interest
factors, joint physical custody would never be awarded when either parent
has committed domestic violence.126 Another premise of this proposal is
119. See Barnes, supra note 59, at 624 (stating that failure to pay child support increases
poverty among single parent families).





125. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (1997).
126. Id. § 14-09-06.2(1)0).
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that the issue of joint physical custody would only be before the court if
both parents wanted sole custody or if one parent wanted sole custody and
the other parent recommended joint custody. Therefore, court-ordered joint
physical custody would never be forced upon a parent who does not request
custody of a child.
Frequently throughout this article, the example of a rotating custody
arrangement of every two weeks or every month has been used. 27 This is
primarily to eliminate any force in the argument that frequently moving a
child between parents is detrimental. 28 Also, a schedule that only requires
moving the child a few times a month between households is probably more
appropriate in a court-ordered joint physical custody arrangement because
neither parent or only one parent requested joint physical custody. Less
moving between the parents makes it easier to comply with the arrange-
ment. A joint physical custody arrangement that moves the child more
often between the parents, such as a day-to-day rotation, has a greater
chance of success only when the parents agree to it. In a voluntary
situation, the parents have contemplated the greater amount of
communication needed in a day-to-day rotation and have voluntarily
committed themselves to make it successful.
Considering the advantages of joint physical custody, 29 this article
proposes eliminating the presumption against it. This would also eliminate
the need for the judge to "bite the bullet," which requires making a choice
between two equally fit parents.130 Because North Dakota law currently
presumes that joint physical custody is not in the best interests of a child,
the following section provides a roadmap for a lawyer to argue for joint
physical custody under that presumption.
127. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 96. Two researchers have noted that the
duration of stay with each parent and the frequency of shifting between households "are probably
important influences that mediate the effect of joint custody on children." Id.
128. Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 930 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Nev. 1997). One court has noted that the
most extensive study addressing this issue has demonstrated that alternating children between
households does not have "the degree of adverse impact on children that is predicted by" the
critics of joint physical custody. Id. at n.l.
129. Clingempeel & Reppucci, supra note 23, at 91; Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 60, at
489.
130. See Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 499 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting)
(referring to a situation where the trial court had to decide between two equally fit parents as
having to "bite the bullet").
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V. MAKING A CASE FOR JOINT PHYSICAL CUSTODY UNDER
CURRENT NORTH DAKOTA LAW
Until North Dakota eliminates its presumption against joint physical
custody, a lawyer must prove that joint physical custody is in the best
interests of a child.131 How does a lawyer prove this when the current law
states that joint physical custody is not in the best interest of a child?132 To
answer this question, it is helpful to give the rule a more accurate definition.
While the North Dakota Supreme Court has uniformly required courts to
state that joint physical custody is in the "best interests" of a child, a more
accurate phrase for the rule is that a court may grant joint physical custody
in "exceptional circumstances."133
A review of the joint physical custody cases where the supreme court
has either affirmed or reversed the awardl 34 demonstrates that it will
approve the award only if certain exceptional circumstances exist. Viewing
the case law from an "exceptional circumstances" perspective combines the
varying strength presumptions into one cohesive rule. 135
One exceptional circumstance that a lawyer must demonstrate is that
the parents are able to cooperate.136 In the only case with a definitive ruling
131. Peek v. Berning, 2001 ND 34, T 20, 622 N.W.2d 186, 193.
132. See Knutson v. Knutson, 2001 ND 238, T 19, 639 N.W.2d 495, 502 (citing Peek, 19,
622 N.W.2d at 192) (stating "[iut is not generally in the best interest of a child to be bandied back
and forth between parents in a rotating physical custody arrangement").
133. When both parents come out equal under the best interests analysis of section 14-09-
06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code, then a joint physical custody arrangement should be in
the best interests of a child because both parents meet the child's best interests. The North Dakota
Supreme Court has never identified the additional factors that a trial court should look at to
determine whether joint physical custody is in the best interests of a child. Some states have held
that joint physical custody should only be awarded in exceptional circumstances. See Ruffridge v.
Ruffridge, 687 So. 2d 48, 50 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that a court should only award rotating
custody in an exceptional case); In re Marriage of Divelbiss, 719 N.E.2d 375, 383 (Ill. Ct. App.
1999) (quoting Davis v. Davis, 380 N.E.2d 415, 418-19 (Il. Ct. App. 1978)) (stating that courts
should only make alternating custody awards in exceptional situations); Brauer v. Brauer, 384
N.W.2d 595, 598 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that joint physical custody is appropriate only in
exceptional cases).
134. For this purpose, this article only uses Jarvis, Kaloupek, Lapp, and DeForest because
the other joint physical custody cases were remanded for the district court to determine whether
the award was in the child's best interests. See generally Jarvis v. Jarvis, 1998 ND 163, 584
N.W.2d 84; Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 497 (N.D. 1989); Lapp v. Lapp, 293
N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980); DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975). The remanded
cases could not provide any guidance regarding whether the unique facts of those situations were
appropriate for joint physical custody because the supreme court neither approved nor
disapproved of joint physical custody in those situations. While Knutson v. Knutson was brought
to the supreme court on a motion to vacate instead of a direct appeal, it nevertheless provides
some guidance, so it is discussed later as well. Knutson v. Knutson, 2002 ND 29, 1, 639
N.W.2d 495, 497.
135. See discussion supra Part II.
136. See Jarvis, 5 36, 584 N.W.2d at 92 (quoting LITTLE, supra note 4, § 13.01 [1], at 13-7).
MAXIMIZING CUSTODY OPTIONS
on the subject, the father was very angry with his former spouse, and the
trial court noted the animosity between the parents and the fact that the
parents communicated "very little." 37 Therefore, if the parents are at war,
a court will not award joint physical custody. With this extreme situation as
a guidepost, it is difficult to recognize the outer boundaries.
Other jurisdictions provide some guidance for this factor. The focus
for whether parents can cooperate is based upon whether the parents will be
able to communicate regarding their children with the primary concern
being the parents' ability to give priority to the children's best interests. 138
When the record reflects only "minor skirmishes" between the parents and
they were otherwise generally able to make decisions about their children,
joint physical custody may be awarded.139
Another difficult issue with the parental cooperation factor is determin-
ing to what degree the parties would truly be in conflict with each other.
When engaged in a divorce, parents are usually at a higher level of conflict
than normal. "The parties are upset by their failed marriage, by the
presence of third parties, by the need for or unwillingness to pay support, by
disagreements over the allocation of property, and by the gamut of emo-
tions that accompany divorce proceedings."140 A lawyer will want to
ensure that the district court is not unduly swayed by the lower level of
cooperation that usually accompanies child custody proceedings.
A second exceptional circumstance is that the children should not be
very young.' 4 ' Children who are "very young" include infants and pre-
school children,142 so once a child is five years old or older, the exceptional
circumstance of age would likely be met. Even before the North Dakota
Supreme Court announced the age requirement, its cases were implicitly
recognizing this requirement, with one exception. 143
137. See id. 5 37. In a Minnesota case, a court refused to award joint custody where the ani-
mosity between the parents was so intense that the court prohibited them from communicating
with each other. Greenlaw v. Greenlaw, 396 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
138. LITrLE, supra note 4, § 13.06[l], at 13-38 to 13-39.
139. Nolan v. Nolan, 486 N.Y.S.2d 415, 419 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (stating that the par-
ents' relationship was not "fraught with severe antagonism or hostility," and the parents had been
able to cooperate on matters involving their children, so joint physical custody was appropriate).
140. Davis & Yazici, supra note 73, at 349.
141. See In re Lukens, 1998 ND 224, T 15, 587 N.W.2d 141, 145 (quoting LITTLE, supra
note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45).
142. Id. (quoting LrILE, supra note 4, § 13.06[4], at 13-45).
143. See DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 921 (N.D. 1975) (reversing a joint physi-
cal custody award when the child was only four years old); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 123
(N.D. 1980) (affirming a joint physical custody award when the child was six years old). But see
Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 497 (N.D. 1989) (affirming a joint physical custody
award when the child was only two years old). Because Kaloupek was decided prior to In re
Lukens, to the extent the supreme court did not consider the child's young age in Kaloupek, that
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A third exceptional circumstance is that the parents must live in a fairly
close geographic location. 144 While the North Dakota Supreme Court has
never explicitly acknowledged this factor, it is arguably one borne of
common sense. 145 If a trial court has awarded joint physical custody on a
biweekly or monthly alternating basis, it is simply a matter of logistics that
the parents should live close together to facilitate this arrangement. This
factor also fits with the requirement that the children be of school age. The
parents should live in the same geographical area to allow the child to
attend the same school regardless of which parent is exercising custody. 146
In order to argue a successful case for joint physical custody under
current North Dakota law, a lawyer must first have a situation where the
children are at least five years old. Then, if the parents are able to cooper-
ate regarding their children and the parents live within the same geographi-
cal area, a trial court is more likely to grant joint physical custody.
VI. CONCLUSION
Numerous legal scholars have argued for a presumption in favor of
joint physical custody, 147 and some states have legislatively adopted such a
presumption.148 This article does not make such an argument.149 However,
portion of the opinion is possibly overruled. See Lukens, 5 15, 587 N.W.2d at 145 (stating that
rotating custody in the case of very young children is not preferred).
144. See Knutson v. Knutson, Civ. No. 00-0100, slip op. at 2 (E.C.N.D. Aug. 10, 2001),
aff'd, Knutson v. Knutson, 2002 ND 29, 22, 639 N.W.2d 495, 502 (affirming a joint physical
custody award when both parents lived in Fargo); DeForest, 228 N.W.2d at 921 (reversing a joint
physical custody award when the mother lived in Grand Forks and the father lived in Bismarck);
Lapp, 293 N.W.2d at 123 (affirming a joint physical custody award when the mother and father
both lived in Bismarck); Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 497 (affirming a joint physical custody award
when the mother and father both lived in Grand Forks).
145. Steinman, supra note 102, at 411. Other courts have recognized this as an important
consideration. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kelly, 926 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Alaska 1996) (stating that divided
physical custody is typically awarded to parents who live in the same community); Doyle v.
Doyle, 955 S.W.2d 478, 481 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the proximity of the parents'
residences is an important consideration).
146. See Jasper v. Jasper, 351 N.W.2d 114, 117 (S.D. 1984) (quoting Langerman v. Langer-
man, 336 N.W.2d 669, 672 (S.D. 1983)) (stating "frequent shifting of schools can greatly interfere
with the education and proper rearing of children and [may] not be in their best interest"). But see
Flora v. Flora, 707 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986) (affirming a yearly joint physical
custody award that required the children to change school districts annually).
147. Brian J. Melton, Note, Solomon's Wisdom or Solomon's Wisdom Lost: Child Custody
in North Dakota-A Presumption that Joint Custody is in the Best Interests of the Child in Cus-
tody Disputes, 73 N.D. L. REV. 263, 295-96 (1997); Barnes, supra note 59, at 617-18; Davis &
Yazici, supra note 73, at 352; Paradise, supra note 69, at 576.
148. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (Michie 2002); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (West
1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (2002); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 452.375 (1997).
149. This article has only analyzed joint physical custody from the perspective of the best
interests of the child because that is the standard in North Dakota. Others have advanced further
benefits of joint physical custody that do not relate to the best interests of the child. See, e.g.,
MAXIMIZING CUSTODY OPTIONS
after having a presumption against joint physical custody for over twenty-
five years, it would be just as drastic to institute a presumption in favor of
joint physical custody as it was to create one against it in 1975. Also, all of
the studies used in this article that have found either benefits or no harm
resulting from joint physical custody have argued that more research is
needed before their results can be considered definitive. 150
If there is to be a presumption in favor of joint physical custody, that
decision should come from the legislature. It would be for that body to
decide whether the policy of North Dakota should be to favor joint physical
custody. The legislature could embrace benefits of joint physical custody
beyond those discussed in this article.151 Its deliberations could also
encompass more studies on the benefits of joint physical custody. 152
The most important point is that custody awards should always be
individualized decisions. Every family is different, and custody awards
should fit each particular situation. Some of the social science studies used
in this article do not provide a universal prediction for how particular
people will act. For example, some noncustodial parents suffer significant
emotional distress, but that is not true in every case. Therefore, some of the
benefits of joint physical custody will not apply in every situation.
As a general principle, it is undisputed that children benefit from
significant continuous contact with both parents after a divorce. This factor
alone should give parents and courts pause when determining an appropri-
ate custody award. To continue a presumption against joint physical
Davis & Yazici, supra note 73, at 352 (stating that a presumption in favor of joint physical
custody would eliminate most of the custody litigation, which would reduce the strain on the court
system); Frederic W. Ilfeld, Jr. et al., Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of
Relitigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62, 65 (1982) (concluding that there was less relitigation of
the custody decision in joint custody arrangements as opposed to exclusive custody
arrangements).
150. See Brinig & Buckley, supra note 115, at 394 (stating "[miore research is needed on
the relation between joint-custody laws, child support, and divorce"); Steinman, supra note 102, at
414 (stating that more research needs to be done before "embracing joint custody as a broadly
applicable policy"); WALLERSTEIN & BLAKESLEE, supra note 52, at 270 (stating that larger
studies are needed to assess the effects of joint custody); see generally Clingempeel & Reppucci,
supra note 23 (describing the gaps in the research on joint custody).
151. See, e.g., Ilfeld et al., supra note 149, at 65 (concluding that joint custody
arrangements are not relitigated as often as exclusive custody arrangements); Brinig & Buckley,
supra note 115, at 423 (arguing that a presumption in favor of joint physical custody might reduce
divorce rates); Davis & Yazici, supra note 73, at 352 (stating that a presumption in favor of joint
physical custody would reduce the strain on the court system).
152. Even someone trained in the relevant social sciences can easily overlook important
studies on joint physical custody. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social
Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. REv. 107,
124 (1987) (stating that people can be aware of the important studies on a social science topic only
if they have diligently kept current with the literature on that particular topic).
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custody only makes it more difficult to choose it as the appropriate custody
award in the proper case.
